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the defendant's motion and to his application here is that 
good cause appears for continuing the case beyond the 60-
day period ( 1) by the consent of the defendant to postpone-
ment of the trial beyond the 60-day period, and (2) by the 
reasonableness of the delay thereafter due to the fact that 
the court was engaged in the trial of other cases. 
The order to show cause is discharged and the ·petition for 
a writ is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., dissented. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied July 
10, 1952. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the applica-
tion should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 19435. In Bank. June 20, 1952.] 
THE ROSICRUCIAN FELLOWSHIP (a Corporation) et 
al., Appellants, v. THE ROSICRUCIAN FELLOW-
SHIP NON-SECTARIAN CHURCH (a Corporation) 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Religious Societies-Internal A1fairs-Jurisdiction of Courts. 
-General rule that courts will not interfere in religious 
societies with reference to their ecclesiastical practices is 
qualified by rule that civil and property rights will be ad-
judicated. 
[2] !d.-Internal A1fairs-Jurisdiction of Oourts.-In a contro-
versy between religious societies as to use of property and 
[1] Determination by civil. courts of property rights between 
contending factions of an independent chmch, notes, 8 A.L.R. 
105; 70 A.L.R. 75. See, also, Oa.l.Jur., Religious and Charitable 
Societies, § 13; Am.Jur., Religious Societies, § 41. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Religious Societies, § 11; [3] 
Equity, § 20; [4, 5] Religious Societies, § 13(1); [6] Religious 
Societies, § 18; [7] Religious Societies, § 16; [8] Religious So-
cieties, §12; [9] Contracts, §108; [10] Injunctions, §14; [11] 
Religious Societies, § 19; [12] Injunctions, § 12; [13] Injunctions, 
§ 33; [14] Religious Societies, § 20. · 
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exercise of other rights, it is necessary to ascertain from the 
acts, dealings and usages of the parties where the various 
rights rest to determine the ownership of civil and property 
rights, even though some so-called ecclesiastical functions are 
so interwoven with civil and property rights that any decision 
involving the latter must necessarily affect the former. 
[S] Equity-Disposal of Entire Controversy-Facts at Time of 
Trial.-In an action in the nature of an equitable proceeding, 
the court may consider the facts as they existed at the time 
of trial so that the interests of justice may be subserved. 
[4] Religious Societies-Property Rights.-Where the rights in-
volved in a controversy between religious societies are essen-
tially property in nature, some of them may be in one society 
and others in another society in accordance with the conduct 
and usage of the parties. 
[5] !d.-Property Rights.-Where an unincorporated church and 
its members from the first exercised property and civil rights 
incident to ecclesiastical functions, and a corporation later 
formed for the purpose of transferring to it certain property 
and some temporal functions of the unincorporated church 
association was organized without the consent of the unin-
corporated association or its members, there has not been 
a surrender of all rights to the corporation or an acquiescence 
of its exercise of such rights so as to estop the association 
from asserting them. 
[6] Id.- Evidence.- Where the evidence is conflicting as to 
whether a church or a corporation subsequently formed was 
to exercise ecclesiastical functions or whether such corpora-
tion was first organized as a college or seminary and was to 
be only the trustee of certain property or was to exercise 
only physical or purely business functions, it is for the trial 
court to weigh the evidence and draw any reasonable infer-
ences deducible therefrom. 
[7] Id.-Parties.-One or more members of a church may prose-
cute an action or cross-action for the benefit of all if sufficient 
facts are pleaded to make it a proper representative suit; in 
such a case all the persons represented are not indispensable 
parties. · · 
[8] Id.-Oontracts.-A contract between woman establishing an 
organization for dissemination of certain religious teachings 
and an older corporation distributing such teachings for dis-
solution of the organization formed by her, granting to cor-
poration an irrevocable license to publish all writings covered 
by copyrights owned by such woman, providing for her elec-
tion as trustee of corporation, chairman of its executive com-
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mittee and manager of its activities, and also providing that 
she was to become ''President Emeritus" on retiring from 
authority, indicates that she was to hold the positions named 
until she retired from authority, and is breached by her re-
moval from such positions against her wishes. 
[9] Contracts-Consideration-PJ::oof.-Testimony of witness that 
she received no consideration for giving up her right to license 
the use of certain writings to another may be considered as 
showing that she did not receive consideration where no ob-
jection was made to such testimony as being a conclusion 
drawn by her. 
[10] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Acts Completed.-An in-
junction is ordered against past acts only if there is evidence 
that they will probably recur. 
[11] Religious Societies-Injunctive Relief.-Part of injunction 
restraining interference by corporation with "dominant use" 
of property for ecclesiastical purposes by church followers 
is not uncertain where the quoted words clearly mean su-
perior right and the judgment in other parts defines such 
rights. 
[12] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Freedom of Speech.-An 
injunction will not be granted where the restraint interferes 
with freedom of speech. 
[13] !d.-Discretion of Oourt.-Injunctive relief is to some extent 
discretionary with the court, and denial of such relief will not 
warrant a reversal unless such discretion has been abused. 
[14] Religious Societies-Appeal-Harmless Error.-Alleged error 
in controversy between religious societies in denying plain-
tiff right to prove by a witness that a list of members ex-
hibited to her contained names of persons who were not mem-
bers of defendant organization is not prejudicial where rights 
were accorded to all followers of religious philosophy involved 
regardless of whether they were members of such organization. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. Robert B. Burch, Judge. Modified and af-
firmed. 
Action to enJom use of name, to which defendants :filed 
a cross-complaint for declaratory relief. Judgment for de-
fendants modified and affirmed. 
[10] See Cal.Jur., Injunction, § 24; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 6. 
[13] See Ca.l.Jur., Injunctions, § 10; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 35. 
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Rollin L. McNitt, Homer C. Compton and Edythe Jacobs 
for Appellants. 
Stewart, Shaw & Murphey, Luce, Forward, Kunzel & 
Scripps, Fred Kunzel and William L. Murphey for Re-
spondents. 
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment that 
plaintij! take nothing by its action to obtain, among other 
things, an injunction against the use of the name ''The 
Rosicrucian Fellowship'' and declaring the rights of the par-
ties in response to defendants' cross-complaint for declara-
tory relief. 
Plaintiff, The Rosicrucian Fellowship, is a corporation 
formed in 1913. Cross-defendants are plaintiff and the trus-
tees of that corporation. Defendants and cross-complainants 
are a church corporation, formed in 1944, The Rosicrucian 
Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church, Mrs. Heindel, and follow-
ers of the rosicrucian philosophy. The controversy mainly 
concerns whether plaintiff corporation or defendant corpora-
tion and the unorganized followers have rights in connection 
with certain property acquired in the course of the develop-
ment of the religious group known as ''The Rosicrucian Fel-
lowship.'' 
The preliminary background of the religioufi! movement is 
not disputed. According to the :findings of the trial court, 
Max Heindel, after study in Europe in 1908, wrote a book 
called "The Cosmo-Conception of Mystic Christianity" which 
he used as a basis .for teaching what he described as the rosi-
crucian philosophy to organized groups of followers, called 
centers, in various cities in the United States. He classified 
his followers, with respect to their proficiency in the philoso-
phy, as disciples, probationers and students. In 1910, Heindel 
married defendant Mrs. Heindel who thereafter assisted him 
in writing, teaching and obtaining followers. The Heindels 
and their followers constituted, until July 6, 1944, an unin-
corporated church association known as ''The Rosicrucian 
Fellowship." This association, as distinguished froin plaintiff 
corporation, was without an ecclesiastical system of church 
government until July 6, 1944, when the defendant corpora-
tion was formed. 
In 1911, Heindel purchased, with his wife's assistance, tak-
ing title in his name, real property in San Diego County 
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called by them "Mt. Ecclesia." Improvements were made on 
the property by them prior to. Heindel's death and by Mrs. 
Heindel thereafter with funds received by them and later by 
plaintiff corporation from contributions from followers and 
the sale of writings. Heindel indicated by letters to his 
followers that he held the property in trust for the use and 
benefit of the followers of the philosophy. In 1913, the Hein-
dels formed plaintiff corporation, named ''The Rosicrucian 
Fellowship,'' for the purpose of transferring to it the property 
known as Mt. Ecclesia and some temporal functions of the 
unincorporated church association. The articles of incorpo-
ration expressed the purpose "to establish a college or semi-
nary for the study" of the rosicrucian philosophy. Under the 
articles and by-laws the followers were not members of the 
corporation. It was formed and the amendments to its 
articles, later mentioned, were adopted without their approval 
or consent, or the approval or consent of the unincorporated 
association previously mentioned. 
The court found that from 1913 until his death in 1919, 
Heindel held title to Mt. Ecclesia, and he and his wife, with 
the assistance of their followers, members of the unincorpo-
rated church association, conducted all the so-called ecclesi-
astical functions for the church association, and at all times, 
until July 6, 1944, Mrs. Heindel and members of the church 
association conducted all such ecclesiastical functions of the 
philosophy, which included teaching, preparing and dissemi-
nating writings and soliciting members. 
Mrs. Heindel, between 1916 and 1919, became the owner of . 
all the writings of her husband by assignment and will. (She 
is still the owner supject to the 1931 contract later mentioned 
herein.) In 1919, after Heindel's death, Mrs. Heindel con-
veyed Mt. Ecclesia to plaintiff corporation in trust for the 
use and benefit of the followers of the philosophy a8 members 
of the church association (later plaintifi corporation acquired 
a:q. ~dditional 10 acres), and later as members of defendant 
corporation. 
In 1925, the articles of plaintifi corporation were amended 
to include among the purposes the establishment of a non-
sectarian church (to teach and dissPminate the rosicrucian 
philosophy) and a sanitarium. In 1931, the articles were 
again · amended,. declaring the establishment of a college of 
le~rning to teach and dissemilfate the philosophy, to be one 
of the purposes. A 1935 amendment changed the name to 
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11 The Rosicrucian College.'' In 1940, the articles were 
amended to recite that the corporation was formed under the 
nonprofit college incorporation law; the name was changed 
back to 1 1 The Rosicrucian Fellowship'' and the purpose was 
again declared to be for the establishment of a church or 
religio~s organization to disseminate the rosicrucian philoso-
phy. 
In January, 1943, the members of the church association 
organized (287 of them) an association for a church institu-
tion, which on July 6, 1944, was incorporated-defendant 
corporation-with the declared purpose of organizing and 
conducting a church. By-laws and rules were adopted for a 
complete system of representative church government. 
Dissension developed in the organization in 1931 when Mrs. 
Heindel withdrew from The Rosicrucian Fellowship and moved 
to Oceanside where she established an organization known as 
the Max Heindel Rose Cross Fellowship, which undertook to 
carry on activities relating to the advancement of the rosicru-
cian philosophy. In settlement of the controversy with re-
spect to the use of the writings, a contract was made between 
plaintiif corporation and Mrs. Heindel in October, 1931, in 
which it was recited that there existed a controversy between 
them concerning the legal ownership of the writings, and that 
Mrs. Heindel had established an organization for disseminat-
ing the teachings theretofore distributed by plaintiif. It was 
agreed that plaintiff should have an 1 1 undisputed, irrevocable 
license, right and permit'' to publish, sell, etc. all writings; 
that, subject to plaintiff's right, Mrs. Heindel was the owner 
· for life of the writings, which would vest on her death in 
plaintiif. Neither party should authorize others to distribute 
the writings without the consent of the other, except that Mrs. 
Heindel could give a license to an organzation formed or 
sponsored by her j plaintiif was to provide a life annuity for 
Mrs. Heindel, paying $125 per month ; if she ceased her activi-
ties competitive with plaintiif before January 15, 1934, the 
annuity would be increased to $208.33 per month; provision 
was made for arbitration; a statement was to be sent to all 
followers that the controversy was settled. The court found 
that defendant corporation is sponsored and led by Mrs. 
Heindel. In October, 1934, another contract was made by 
the same parties in which was recited some of the main pro-
visions of the 1931 contract and that Mrs. Heindel had formed 
a corporation sole, Max Heindel Rose Cross Philosophies, 
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which was distributing the writings and had a following of 
2,050; that plaintiff corporation bas continued its activities 
since the "schism," having 4,500 followers; that each has 
certain assets; that Mrs. Heindel and her corporation and fol-
lowers have been asked to unite with plaintiff and they have 
accepted and the parties have agreed to a consolidation. In 
consideration of $1.00 paid by each to the other and other 
valuable consideration it was agreed that Mrs. Heindel's 
corporation shall be dissolved and its books and equipment 
shall be transferred to plaintiff and paid for at a specified 
price. The 1931 contract was continued in force except that 
Mrs. Heindel did not have the right to grant to any organi-
zation the right to use the writings. Mrs. Heindel's annuity 
was fixed at $125 per month. As a part of the consideration, 
Mrs. Heindel was to have living quarters and sustenance at 
Mt. Ecclesia for life; to be elected a trustee of plaintiff and 
"elected" chairman of the "executive or governing commit-
tee" ; to become the "manager" in charge of activities of 
plaintiff under the committee of five, naming three of them; 
the lessons and letters to be signed by her on behalf of plain-
tiff; and she was to be editor of the magazine. It was finally 
recited that: ''All the parties hereto are of one mind upon the 
proposition that the schism referred to above has caused great 
misunderstanding upon the part of many people and has 
injured and delayed the progress of the work. It is believed 
by all concerned that a repetition of conditions which re-
sulted from this schism is to be avoided in view of the fact 
that Max Heindel, as a representative of the Elder Brothers 
of the order brought these teachings to the people, and that 
Mrs. Heindel spent years of her active life helping to build 
up the institution, that a part of the consideration of this 
contract should be assurance to her that if at any time she 
ceases to be active in connection with the work and retires 
from authority, that she shall then become President Emeritus 
of the organization for life, and that her annuities, her living 
quarters and her sustenance shall continue during her life-
time, and that she will cooperate with the Fellowship to the 
end that the teachings of the Rosicrucian Philosophies may be 
given to the world to the best possible advantage.'' The court 
interpreted the contract to mean that the consideration run-
ning to Mrs. Heindel was that she was entitled to be a trustee, 
chairman of the governing committee and manager of plaintiff 
corporation at all times thereafter until she voluntarily re-
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tired. Th~ corporation performed its promise until Febru-
ary, 1942, when she was removed from the positions against 
her wishes. On October 7, 1944, Mrs. Heindel gave notice 
of cancellation of the 1934 contract. 
The troubles evidently came to a head after Mrs. Heindel 
was removed from her positions, for on April 6, 1942, Weaver, 
Munson and Grow, as members of the unincorporated church, 
commenced an action in the Superior Court of San Diego 
County. The action was against plaintiff corporation and 
the trustees thereof, and it was there found that they sued 
on behalf of _500 members of the church. Plaintiffs there 
sought a declaration that they and the other members had 
a right to participate in the election of trustees of plaintiff 
corporation and to recover $41,939.56, alleged to have been 
misapplied by the trustees in the operation of the sanitarium 
at Mt. Ecclesia during the period from 1939 to 1942. The 
judgment in that action declared that plaintiff corporation 
was existing and that its articles were legally amended in 
1925, 1930, 1931, 1935 and 1940, and all its by-laws were 
legally adopted ; the followers of the rosicrucian philosophy 
constitute a church known as ''The Rosicruc1an Fellowship'' 
as distinguished from plaintiff corporation; that the church 
has no ecclesiastical organization or system of church govern-
ment; that plaintiff corporation owns and holds Mt. Ecclesia 
as trustee for the members of the church; that the church mem-
bers are entitled to an accounting from the corporation for 
misapplication of funds; that the followers of the philosophy 
and members of the church are not corporate members of the 
corporation and are not entitled to vote for the election of 
trustees ; that the church. has no spiritual head; and that the 
removal of Mrs. Heindel in February, 1942, as president of 
plaintiff corporation was legal• 
Based upon the :findings the court in the case at bar ren-
dered judgment declaring that all of Mt. Ecclesia and all 
personal property thereon was owned by plaintiff corporation 
but that the· church association and defendant corporation 
and followers were entitled to the dominant use of the prop-
erty for so-called religious purposes without interference 
inasmuch as :plaintiff corporation held it only as a trustee 
and they were beneficiaries. It was also declared that such 
beneficiaries had the dominant right to enjoy and use such 
•That action was entitled Wea11er v. Meync'ke and the judgment be-
came 1!nai in the superior court. 
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property for such functions which include ''lecturing, teach-
ing of the Rosicrucian Philosophy to people interested therein; 
the establishment of centers for the study and teaching of 
Mystic Christianity as interpreted and expounded by Mr. 
and Mrs. Max Heindel in all books, pamphlets and letters 
written by them, or either of them; issuing and revoking 
charters of any and all centers; the preparation of corre-
spondence courses for the study, teaching and dissemination 
of the Rosicrucian Philosophy; the preparation of all ecclesi-
astical and esoteric lessons and letters to Students, Proba-
tioners and Disciples; the preparation of horoscopes and 
astrodiagnosis thereof for the assistance and guidance of Stu-
dents, Probationers and Disciples in alleviating mental and 
physical suifering, difficulties and problems; the recommenda-
tion of diets for the physical welfare of Students, Probationers 
and Disciples requesting the same; corresponding with Stu-
dents, Probationers and Disciples in the United States and 
elsewhere regarding the said religious belief, and the teaching 
and dissemination thereof; to suspend and expel Students, 
Probationers and Disciples according to its by-laws, rl;lles and 
regulations'' ; that plaintiff corporation has not acquired the 
right and may not use the property to perform any of those 
functions, and the church association and said · beneficiaries 
have not lost any of such rights by waiver or estoppel; that 
plaintiff corporation may use the property in the conduct of 
the temporal functions including "the printing, publishing, 
selling of said books, pamphlets and letters written by Mr. and 
Mrs. Max Heindel from and after October 23, 1931; the print-
ing or multigraphing and mailing of ecclesiastical and esoteric 
letters and lessons written by Mrs. Max Heindel or other Pro-
bationers or Disciples designated by the Rosicrucian Fellow-
ship Non-Sectarian Church; the possession and use of a mail-
ing list of Students, Probationers and Disciples and addresso-
graph plates and machinery for the transposition thereof, for 
mailing purposes only ; the operation of a lodge and a cafe-
teria; the receipt and recording of Students' monthly report 
cards and Probationers' monthly reports; the employment 
and discharge of empioyees for said purposes; the receipt of 
gifts and contributions specifically designated for said corpo-
ration; the collection of monies from its sale of said books, 
pamphlets and letters and from the operation of said lodge 
and cafeteria; the payment of salaries and taxes; the manage-
39 C.2d-5 
130 ROSICRUCIAN FELLOW. V. RoSICRUCIAN ETC. CR. [39 C.2d 
ment and maintenance of said real property fixtures, improve-
ments and personal property thereon; all for the account and 
benefit of the Probationers and Disciples, as members of the 
said unincorporated church association and as members of 
The Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church, benefi-
ciaries thereof'' ; that Mrs. Heindel is the owner of all the 
copyrights on all the writings ; that the church association 
and defendant corporation and members may use the name 
"The Rosicrucian Fellowship"; that the members of the 
defendant corporation and followers of the philosophy own 
the list of names and addresses of all followers; that the 1934 
contract above referred to was breached by plaintiff corpo-
ration and is "null and void" but the corporation has the 
nonexclusive right under the 1931 contract to publish and 
sell the writings; that defendant corporation has a nonex-
clusive right under a license agreement of 1944 from Mrs. 
Heindel to publish and sell such writings. Injunctive relief 
was granted against plaintiff corporation wherein it was re-
strained from doing various things later mentioned herein. 
From the judgment it is clear that the main object was to pre-
serve the use of the property to the followers of the philoso-
phy, and as later seen, not to interfere with them in the exer-
cise of their .ecclesiastical functions. 
The main contention of plaintiff corporation on this appeal 
is that the court had no jurisdiction to decide who was entitled 
to exercise the ecclesiastical functions pertaining to the rosi-
crucian philosophy ; that first the unincorporated church asso-
ciation and later the defendant corporation and members had 
such power. . 
The provisions of the judgment and discussions during the 
trial, taking them as a whole, though in part couched in 
language dealing with ecclesiastical functions, purport to deal 
with civil and property rights, such ·as, who may use the 
property at Mt. Ecclesia, lists of members, rights to prop-
erty, rights in the writings and disposal thereof, solicitation 
of members and contributions. It should be observed that vari-
ous rights affected by the judgment have civil and property 
right connotations. Illustrations are: The right to use a 
name "The Rosicrucian Fellowship" (see Law v. Crist, 41 
Cal.App.2d 862 [107 P.2d 953]); the publication and sale of 
copyrighted books and documents and emblems (see John-
ston v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal.App.2d 196 [187 
P .2d 474;] }; mailing lists (see California Intelligence Bureau 
v. Cunningham, 83 Cal.App.2d 197 [188 P.2d 303] ). Hence 
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the judgment may well be proper as reaching and affecting 
such rights, as it does, although by its language it might seem 
to go further and declare who may carry out so-called ecclesi-
astical functions, which may include the right to use the 
property to teach the philosophy and the solicitation of mem-
bers and contributions. 
[1] The general rule that courts will not interfere in 
religious societies with reference to their ecclesiastical practices 
stems from the separation of the church and state, but has 
always been qualified by the rule that civil and property rights 
would be adjudicated. (See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 
(U.S.) 679 [20 L.Ed. 666] ; Church of Christ of Long Beach 
v. Harper, 83 Cal.App. 41 [256 P. 476]; Dyer v. Superior 
Court, 94 Cal.App. 260 [271 P. 113].) There are two ways 
in which the problem may arise. The question may arise as 
to the extent to which the court is bound by the decisions of 
the church tribunals in either ecclesiastical or temporal mat-
ters, or the scope of the jurisdiction the court will exercise 
when there are no such tribunals but there are disputes be-
tween factions concerning ecclesiastical and temporal mat-
ters. In the instant case the court found that there was no 
established church system or government therefor and hence 
no church tribunals. Whether an activity is ecclesiastical or 
involves property rights, especially when a decision on one 
necessarily involves consideration of the other, are difficult 
questions. Ecclesiastical matters include in the main, creeds 
and proper modes of exercising one's belief. While the prin-
ciple that courts will not purport to exercise eccelesiastical 
jurisdiction is settled as an abstract p_roposition, they will 
determine civil and property rights which depend essentially 
on the contracts of the parties as evinced by rules, regulations, 
practices and customs accepted and followed. The matter 
has been generally summarized: "It is obvious that no case 
can reach the civil courts unless it involves some property 
or other civil right. The courts of the land are not con-
cerned with mere polemic discussions, and cannot coerce the 
performance of obligations of a spiritual character, or adopt 
a judicial standard for theological orthodoxy, or determine 
the abstract truth of religious doctrines, or adjudicate whether 
a certain person is a Catholic in good standing, or settle mere 
questions of faith or doctrine, or make changes in the liturgy, 
or dictate the policy of a church in the seating of the sexes, 
or the playing of instrumental music, or decide who the right-
ful leader of a church ought to be, or enjoin a clergyman from 
132 RosiCRUCIAN FELLow. v. RosiCRUCIAN ETa. CH. [39 C.2d 
striking the complainant's name from his register of communi-
cants, or enforce the religious right of a member to partake 
of the Lord's Supper."· (American Church Law, Zollman, 
§ 313.) It is also settled principle that: "It is perfectly 
clear that, whatever church relationship is maintained in the 
United States, is not a matter of status. It is based, not on 
residence, or birth, or compulsion, but on voluntary consent. 
It rests on faith, 'primarily, faith in. God and his teachings; 
secondarily, faith in and reliance upon each other.' It is 
'one of contract,' and is therefore exactly what the parties 
to it make it and nothing more. A person who joins a church 
covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the 
benefits which result :from such a union he will submit to its 
control and be governed by its laws, usages and customs 
whether they are of an ecclesiastical or temporal character 
to which laws, usages, and customs he assents as to so many · 
stipulations of a contract. The formal evidence of such con-
tract is contained in the canons of the church, the constitution, 
articles, and by-laws of the ~ociety, and the customs and 
usages which have grown up in connection with these instru-
ments." (American Church Law, Zollman, § 328.) 
There appears to be no question between the parties here 
as to the proper way or method of teaching the philosophy 
or its principles. Rather, the dispute concerns who shall have 
the right to use the property, to teach the philosophy, and 
exercise the other rights herein enumerated. Closely related 
to the right to use the property are also involved the rights 
of solicitation of, and contributions :from members, and of 
selling the writings. In fact, plaintiff corporation by its com-
plaint demands a settlement of these matters for it prays 
that it should be a~corded the right to solicit membership and 
contributions, to use the writings, have the mailing lists and 
be fr!!e :from interference in conducting its meetings, services 
and lectures. Moreover, the dispute between the parties has 
been going on for many years and should be settled. 
In connection with the jurisdictional question, plaintiff cor-
.poration argues further, that religious organizations are dual 
jn nature, one part consisting of the members as a spiritual 
body, and the other as an unincorporated entity constituting 
the secular body; and that the plaintiff corporation here is 
the secular body. It is argued that this was determined by the 
decree in Weaver v. Meyncke, and reference is made to state-
ments that a chu:rch society does not lose its identity by in-
corporatll;lg ;. that the corporation and the church, although 
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one, may exist within the pole of the other, are not correlative, 
but each is independent of the other, one dealing with spiritual 
things and the other temporal. (See 45 Am.Jur., Religious 
Societies, § 8; Wheelock v. First Presb. Church, 119 Cal. 477 
[51 P. 841] .) [2] The essential problem, nevertheless, is to as-
certain from the acts, dealings and usages of the parties where 
the various rights rest in order to determine the ownership of 
civil and property rights, even though some so-called ecclesi-
astical rights are involved. Plaintiff corporation was found 
to own the property at Mt. Ecclesia but as a trustee for the un-
incorporated church, its members, and defendant corporation 
and its members. Organized, or unorganized, or lacking in 
an established church government, the followers of Mr. and 
Mrs. Heindel, and later of Mrs. Heindel, were as a group, 
the beneficiaries, and as such have always possessed the other 
rights accorded them in the judgment. As shown by the 
discussion earlier in this opinion some of the so-called eccle-
siastical functions are so interwoven with civil and property 
· rights that any decision involving the latter must necessarily 
affect the former. Moreover, it was recognized in the reci-
tations in the 1931 contract with Mrs. Heindel, that both 
plaintiff corporation and the followers as a group had some 
rights somewhat in the nature of both ecclesiastical and prop-
erty. 
Plaintiff urges that generally courts have classi,fied religi-
ous organizations into three categories: (1) Where one or 
a few persons, usually claiming divine right, control the whole 
hierarchy, including the local churches or societies; (2) Where 
there is a similar hierarchy but an assembly is in control ; and 
(3) Where each local group is in charge of all its affairs 
through majority vote of its members and there is no control 
from above. (See Watson v. Jones, supra; 45 Am.Jur., Religi-
ous Societies, § 4.) It is also urged that where there is a 
schism or split between the followers or members of a society 
in the third class, or in an anomalous class which fits in none 
of the three, like the Rosicrucians, those adhering to the origi-
nal structure, whether or not they constitute a majority of all 
the members, are declared to have all of the property rights. 
It is argued that plaintiff corporation is the original struc-
ture and, therefore, it must have the property rights rather 
than the unorganized church or followers who later formed 
defendant corporation. 
The basic question in a controversy such as this should be 
the ownership of civil and property rights as shown by the 
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conduct and acts of the parties. A classification based on a 
formula is not of much assistance, especially when we have, 
as we do here, an anomalous arrangement. (See American 
Church Law, Zollman, § 328, supra.) Nor is it important 
whether a schism in the technical sense has occurred so far 
as the creed or philosophy is concerned, and the :findings and 
judgment on a whole show that there has been none. It ap-
pears that from the first, the unorganized church and its 
members through its leaders, the Heindels, have exercised 
property and civil rights incident to ecclesiastical functions 
which were not surrendered to plaintiff corporation. As 
heretofore stated the court found that centers, or groups of 
followers, were formed by Mr. Heindel in 1909, before plain-
tiff corporation was formed. It was also found that after 
the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Heindel, they taught, wrote, 
sold writings, and solicited members; that from 1910 to 1913 
their followers constituted an unincorporated church associa-
tion known as "The Rosicrucian Fellowship"; that the Mt. 
Ecclesia property was purchased and improved in part by 
contributions from those followers and the property was de-
clared by Heindel to be held in trust for the followers ; that 
plaintiff corporation was formed in 1913 to hold Mt. Ecclesia 
for the benefit of the followers, but without their consent; 
that from 1913 to 1919, the Heindels, with the assistance of 
the followers as members of the church, 11 conducted all eccle-
siastical functions for the church'' and continued to do so 
until1944. Those functions included obtaining contr-ibutions, 
using Mt. Ecclesia, lecturing, teaching, the preparation, dis-
semination and sale of writings which had, as above seen, 
property and civil right aspects; that Mt. Ecclesia was deeded 
to plaintiff corporation in trust for the benefit of the followers 
but title to the writings was retained by Mrs. Heindel; that 
plaintiff corporation conducted certain business affairs all for 
the benefit of the unincorporated church, and that it also 
performed some so-called ecclesiastical functions without the 
consent of the followers who did not waive their right to or-
ganize themselves into a permanent church organization but 
did organize defendant corporation with a complete church 
government. In short, the true organization was the unincor-
porated church association, its members and the members of 
defendant corporation which was incorporated in 1944. It 
was, and is, the true and original structure, in ecclesiastical 
and secular activities, and any functions exercised by plaintiff 
corporation, except the management of the Mt. Ecclesia prop-
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erty and the license from Mrs. Heindel to use the writings, 
were usurped by plaintiff corporation. The court found that 
a majority of the followers formed defendant corporation 
and while that was a factor considered by the court in reach-
ing its conclusion as to the ownership of the rights, it was also 
predicated on the premise that the unincorporated church 
was the basic group and owned most of the rights. The judg-
ment preserved to plaintiff corporation the limited rights as 
trustee of Mt. Ecclesia and the license to use the writings. 
From the foregoing it is clear that the court did not adopt any 
different system than had existed for the ownership and exer-
cise of the rights involved as claimed by plaintiff corporation. 
It determined the basic rights of the parties as shown by cus-
tom, usage, and past practices of the parties themselves. 
Plaintiff asserts that no notice was given to the followers 
of the formation of defendant corporation; that a majority did 
not agree thereto ; and that the court erred in considering the 
number who had joined at the time of trial rather than the 
number at the time the action was commenced. The court 
found that by April, 1945, 541 probationers and disciples out 
of 706 in the United States had become members of defend-
ant corporation, which is, of course, a majority. [3] Inas-
much as this action is in the nature of an equitable proceed-
ing, the court may consider the facts as they existed at the 
time of trial so that the interests of justice may be subserved. 
(Mercer Casualty Co . v. Lewis, 41 Cal.App.2d 918 [108 P.2d 
65].) Defendant corporation has offered to prove here that 
most of the foreign followers have also applied for membership. 
We think that is unnecessary as we feel the court was justi-
fied in assuming that a sufficiently substantial number of those 
who could reasonably be reached had joined. Moreover, we 
understand the judgment to accord the rights to all members 
of the. unincorporated church association, as well as defend-
ant corporation, and hence the foreign followers have not been 
prejudiced. 
Plaintiff asserts there cannot be two corporations, plaintiff 
and defendant, with one controlling temporal affairs and 
the other, a religious corporation, controlling ecclesiastical 
matters. It is contended that a corporation cannot be formed 
for ecclesiastical purposes, that it may exercise only temporal 
powers. (Wheelock v. First Presb. Church, 119 Cal. 477 [51 
P. 841].) In that case, the court speaks of the formation of 
nonprofit corporations for religious purposes, which could be 
formed for any lawful purpose Uilder former section 593 of 
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the Civil Code, which authorized the formation of corpora-
tions for secular purposes only. Defendants urge that corpo-
rations may be formed to carry on religious, as well as tem-
poral functions, under the law existing when defendant cor-
poration was formed. That law, now Corporations Code, sec-
tion 9200, provides that nonprofit corporations may be formed 
for any lawful purpose for which persons may associate 
themselves, such as religious purposes. [4] However, it is 
not material here, because, as we have seen, the rights which 
we interpret the judgment to affect, are essentially property 
in nature and we see no reason why some of them may not 
be in plaintiff and others in defendant corporations in ac-
cordance with the conduct and usage of the parties. The judg-
ment states that all of Mt. Ecclesia, and the personal prop-
erty thereon, is held by plaintiff corporation for the use and 
benefit of cross-complainants as probationers and disciples of 
the philosophy, ''as members of the unincorporated church 
association organized in 1908 and 1909" and as members of 
''defendant corporation, as beneficiaries.'' Thus, all followers, 
whether members of the unincorporated church, or the defend-
. ant corporation, are beneficiaries and may use the property. 
We do not construe it to mean that only the members of de-
fendant corporation are beneficiaries entitled to use the prop-
Prty. Hence it is of no particular consequence whether de-
fendant corporation was formed for a valid purpose, or that 
mPmhPrs of nefendant corporation are also mentioned as bem~­
ficiariPs hl'cause members and followers of the philosophy are 
thP truE' beneficiaries. 
Plfdntiff corporation claims that the church R.Ssociation 
ann ih; members turned over the functions of conducting 
thE' r.hurch to it ann that they are now !'Stopped to claim those 
fnnr.tions or that the association is unincorporated. It rf'ff'rs 
to thE' finding that at all times after 1913 (the date of its 
formation) the church association and its mem berR were un-
inrorporated but it was also founn that it, plaintiff corpora-
tion, conducted temporal and se.cular functions for the mem-
bers of the church association and has the right, subject to the 
dominant right of the association, to use the property for tem-
poral purposes; that tbf' church association was formed and 
reg-ulations adopt!'d by it without the consent of plaintiff cor-
poration. Plaintiff corporation appears to assert that it has 
the right to exercise ecclesiastical functions, a matter which 
in other places it claims a corporation cannot have. The find-
ings show that from 1913 to 1924 plaintiff corporation con-
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ducted ''certain'' secular functions and the judgment accorded 
it that power. It was also found that the followers did not 
consent to the formation of plaintiff corporation or its regula-
tions. In this connection plaintiff asserts that the judgment 
in Weaver v. Meyncke is contrary to the present holding. We 
find nothing inconsistent in the holding of these cases. In 
the Weaver case the main question was whether the trustees 
of plaintiff had misappropriated trust funds. It was there 
found that plaintiff corporation was a corporation and its 
articles were legally amended; that none of the members of 
the unincorporated church were members of the corporation 
or entitled to vote for the trustees thereof; that such members 
had not been deprived of any right in the corporation. It was 
also found, however, that the members of the church were 
cestuis of the corporation trustee and were entitled to apply 
to the court for relief from any corporate mismanagement; 
that the property was held by the corporation as trustee for 
the members, all in harmony with the judgment here. So far 
as the legality of the formation of the corporation and amend-
ments of its articles is concerned, the law may have been com-
plied with without constituting a surrender by the church 
association and its members of all their rights to the property. 
Reasonably interpreted, the Weaver findings and ' judgment 
do no more than generally recognize plaintiff corporation as 
owner of Mt. Ecclesia as trustee for the unincorporated church 
association. It does not' purport to deal with the right to use 
the property or the details of the ecclesiastical rights which 
have property right aspects (as heretofore mentioned) which 
have been exercised by the unincorporated association. 
[5] The essence of plaintiff's contention in this respect 
seems to be that since the unincorporated church association 
had surrendered all its rights and powers to it, and that as it, 
plaintiff, had exercised those rights over a period of time with 
the acquiescence of the association, the latter is now estopped 
to assert them. As heretofore seen, the court found that there 
was no waiver by, or estoppel. on the part of, the church 
association or its members, and that they owned the rights sub-
ject to certain rights in plaintiff; that there was an organized 
system or church government, and that the members did not 
consent to the incorporation of plaintiff or amendments to its 
articles of incorporation. We cannot say there has been a sur-
render of all rights to plaintiff, or a recognition that plaintiff. 
had all of those rights, as was the case in Baker v. Ducker, 
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79 Cal. 365 [21 P. 764], Bear v. HeasZey, 98 Mich. 279 (57 
N.W. 270, 24 L.R.A. 615] and other cases cited by plaintiff. 
[6] Plaintiff asserts that the evidence shows it was to have 
all of the rights above mentioned. Specifically, it is asserted 
that Heindel told the followers in 1912 that he intended to 
form the corporation, that articles were filed in 1913 in which 
the Heindels were two of the five incorporators, and the fol-
lowers were told of the incorporation; that Seattle center 
followers turned their assets over to the corporation and took 
their instructions in the philosophy from plaintiff; that plain-
tiff corporation adopted and enforced rules dealing with the 
operation of the philosophy; that it has enrolled a substantial 
number of followers; and that Mrs. Heindel organized a 
church, Max Heindel Rose-Cross Philosophies, which was dis-
solved by the 1934 agreement. On the other hand, there is 
evidence that instructions in the dissemination of the philoso-
phy were not taken from plaintiff; that plaintiff was first 
organized as a college or seminary corporation and it was 
to be only the trustee of the property; that Heindel did not 
transfer the property to plaintiff; that the property was not 
transferred until after his death; that the Heindels and fol-
lowers were carrying on so-called ecclesiastical functions and 
using the property to disseminate their writings ; that Mr. and 
Mrs. Heindel were the leaders in the church association (later, 
Mrs. Heindel was the leader) ; that the unorganized church 
association used the name ''The Rosicrucian Fellowship'' and 
was the church rather than plaintiff; that title to the writings 
has always remained with Mrs. Heindel; that only physical, 
or purely business, functions were carried on by plaintiff; that 
plaintiff has no members except the trustees who were self-
perpetuating. It was for the trial court to weigh the evidence 
and draw any reasonable inferences deducible therefrom. 
Hence the authorities (Linke v. Church of Jesus Christ, 71 
Cal.App.2d 667 (163 P.2d 44], and others) cited by plaintiff 
to the effect that one who joins a church submits to its consti-
tution and by-laws, are not in point. We think it is clear 
from the record that the church was the unincorporated asso-
ciation of followers as found by the court. 
Near the end of the trial, without objection and by leave 
of court, defendants amended their cross-complaint by adding 
an allegation to the effect that the action was prosecuted for 
the benefit of all those persons in the United State who are 
believers in the philosophy as taught by the Heindels, and 
stated that there were approximately 706 such persons ; that 
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it would be impracticable to name them all as parties. In 
other words, the cross-complaint wa.S amended to show that 
the action was a representative one. Plaintiff claims that it 
was not a proper case for a representative action in that it 
did not purport to include followers outside the United States ; 
that it was not brought in good faith, because counsel for cross-
complainants stated in court that the representation was only 
of defendant corporation members; that the defendant corpo-
ration cannot be a representative inasmuch as its interests are 
adverse to those purported to be represented. It further claims 
that because the action was not a representative one, all the 
believers were indispensable parties. 
[7] We believe the cross-complaint pleads sufficient facts 
to make this a proper representative suit. There was no bad 
faith shown on the part of the cross-complainants. The dis-
cussion with reference to the amendment ef the cross-complaint 
was general and, at the trial before the amendment, the action 
was treated as a representative one to which plaintiff made no 
objection. The cross-complainants, other than defendant and 
cross-complainant corporation, are followers of the philosophy. 
The basic issue involved was as to the dominant use of the 
property and, as we have seen, the judgment, if properly 
interpreted, preserved that use to all the followers, whether 
members of the unincorporated church association or defend-
ant corporation. Followers, other than members of defendant 
corporation, are not excluded nor are members in foreign 
lands deprived of any rights. Whether the foreign members 
are bound by the judgment need not be determined. It follows 
that there is no adverse interest because the judgment protects 
R.ll followers, and we see no reason why the followers who are 
cross-complainants could not, in p_art at least, choose a cor-
poration they had formed, the defendant corporation, to lead 
in t')le representative suit. Generally speaking, in con-
troversies such as this it is considered that: " ... [P]lain-
tiffs [members of a church suing in behalf of all] bring the 
action for the benefit of all the members of the . . . Church. 
In effect, each member is a party plaintiff, and that all the 
members could jointly bring the action we feel well assured. 
It is said in Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. (U.S.) 288 [14 L. 
Ed. 942] : 'The rule is well established that where the parties 
interested are numerous, and the suit is for an object common 
to them all, some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf 
of themselvel:! a.nd :the others; and a bill may also be main-
140 RosiCRUCIAN FELLOW. v. RosiCRUCIAN ETc. CH. [39 C.2d 
tained against a portion of a numerous body of defendants rep-
resenting a common interest.' Baker v. Ducker, 79 Cal. 365 
[21 P. 764], is to the same effect." (Wheelock v. First Presb. 
Church, 119 Cal. 477, 481 [51 P. 841] .) It is apparent that 
if this is a proper representative action all the persons repre-
sented are not indispensable parties. If plaintiff's argument 
is to prevail, it is· doubtful that the controversies here could 
ever be settled unless every follower here, and abroad, was 
made a party. Obviously, this would not be feasible. 
Plaintiff makes several contentions with reference to the 
court's determination that the 1934 agreement was breached 
and cancelled and that the 1931 contract was in force and 
effect. The court found, as above noted, that the sole consid-
eration for Mrs. Heindel's agreement in the 1934 contract to 
give plaintiff an exclusive license to use the writings, was 
plaintiff corporation:s promise that she would hold the posi-
tions with the corporation heretofore mentioned for as long 
as she desired; the court found plaintiff breached the contract 
in 1942-194;4 by removing her from the positions in failing to 
reelect her. 
Plaintiff argues that the contract does not require that 
she hold positions so long as she desires as found by the court. 
[8] We feel that the trial court's construction of the con-
tract is reasonable when all the circumstances are taken into 
consideration. It will be r.ecalled that the agreement recited 
that the 1931 contract had dealt with the right to the 
writings, that Mrs. Heindel could grant to an organization 
sponsored by her, a license to use the writings; that she had 
formed a thriving organization; that plaintiff corporation, 
which advocated the philosophy, had prospered and had 
funds ; that the two organizations should unite for more 
effective operation under the name Rosicrucian Philosophy; 
that the organization formed by Mrs. Heindel should be 
dissolved and the writings held by it. turned over to plaintiff. 
It was agreed that a repetition of a two-organization situation 
was injurious and was to be avoided; Mrs. Heindel's years 
of work were recognized. All of those factors indicated an 
intP.nt to compromise. These factors showed that although 
plaintiff was to have the right to use the writings and Mrs. 
Heindel could not give that right to another organization, 
Mrs. Heindel was not to lose complete control of the writings 
or the situatiQn. · It ·Was then provided that Mrs. Heindel 
should be elected trustee .and to fill vacancies to be created 
in other positions, including chairman of the executive com-
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mittee, composed of five, and to be "manager in charge" 
of the fellowship activities; she was to write, supervise the 
preparation of writings and was to be editor of the magazine; 
and finally, because Mrs. Heindel spent years working in the 
philosophy, she was to have assur!lD.ce that ''if at any time 
she ceases to be active in connection with the work and retires 
from authority," she was to become "President Emeritus." 
It is inferable therefrom that she was not to become president 
emeritus until she voluntarily retired from authority. This 
indicated that until she did so retire she was to hold the 
positions named and retain the authority. If it were otherwise 
the other trustees could, at their will, make the agreement 
meaningless by removing her from the positions, thus leaving 
her a mere empty right. That she was to hold them as long 
as she desired is further evidenced by the fact that the trustees 
acquiesced in the occupancy of the positions by Mrs. Heindel 
from 1934 until 1942. 
Reference is made to the judgment in Weaver v. Meyncke, 
where it was said that Mrs. Heindel's removal from the posi-
tions held by her was "legal." That issue was not involved 
in that case, and although the procedure may have been 
"legal" there was nothing to indicate what the consequences 
of the breach of the 1934 contract would be. 
It should also be observed that plaintiff claims the con-
tract cannot be properly litigated here because Mrs. Hein-
del, not defendant corporation, was a party to the contract 
but that she is not a party here except as a representative 
of the followers, by amendment to the cross-complaint. We 
have concluded that she is a party to this action. She was 
named individually as defendant by plaintiff, and as cross-
complainant in the cross-complaint, and we do not believe 
the amendment excluded her as an individual. She has taken 
an active part in the litigation and will, unquestionably, be 
bound by the judgment. 
For the reasons above discussed the court was justified 
in finding a breach and cancellation of the 1934 contract. 
Implicit in the finding is the conclusion that the breach and 
failure of consideration was of a substantial character al-
though the part of the contract which was breached was not 
the sole consideration therefor as Mrs. Heindel was to receive, 
in addition, sustenance at Mt. Ecclesia. 
Plaintiff urges that there was no allegation of an offer, 
or any offer, to restore the consideration received by Mrs. 
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Heindel under the 1934 agreement and that such an offer 
was necessary. Most of the matters in the other counts were 
reiterated in the four th count of the cross-complaint, and the 
1931 and 1934 contracts are pleaded in haec verba. It was also 
pleaded that the 1934 contract modified the 1931 contract with 
respect to Mrs. Heindel's right to grant a license to use the 
writings and that the sole consideration therefor was that Mrs. 
Heindel was to have living quarters at Mt. Ecclesia and hold 
the positions as long as she desire!l; that in 1942-1944 plaintiff 
caused Mrs. Heindel to be removed from the positions in 
violation of the contract; that on October 7, 1944, Mrs. Heindel 
gave notice to plaintiff of the termination of the contract; 
that a controversy exists between the parties as to whether 
the contract is still in effect. 
We must look at both contracts to see what Mrs. Heindel 
was entitled to receive and what she did receive under the 
1934 contract. Provision was made in the 1931 contract, 
which was continued in force except as modified by the 1934 
contract, for an annuity. The annuity provisions were the 
same in both contracts so she would not be required to restore 
any money received thereunder. The plaintiff and Mrs. Hein-
del have the right to use, and Mrs. Heindel is the owner of, 
the writings under both contracts. Plaintiff could not, but 
Mrs. Heindel could, grant to an organization sponsored by her, 
a license to use the writings. In the 1934 contract she gave 
up that right. Under the latter contract she sold certain 
assets at their market value; that part of the contract was 
performed. The additional things which Mrs. Heindel WSB to 
receive under the 1934 contract, and which would be the only 
ones considered so far as restoration is concerned were that 
she was to have living quarters at Mt. Ecclesia and to be 
allowed "sustenance" at the cafeteria there. She testified 
that she used the $3,200 she received from the transferred 
assets for furniture, supplies, and the houses in which she 
lived, and that she received "no compensation" and no "con-
sideration'' for giving up her right to license the use of the 
writings to another. [9] Plaintiff claims that was a con-
clusion drawn by Mrs. Heindel and that it was not evidence, 
citing Huntsman v. State Harbor Commrs., 17 Cal.App.2d 
749 [62 P.2d 771], but no objection was made to the answer 
and it may be considered as showing that she did not receive 
consideration. In the Huntsman case the question was whether 
there was a valid contract insofar as consideration therefor 
w~s concerned. The contract there provided for consideration 
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on its face. The question here is whether the promised 
consideration was received as it relates to the necessity for 
restoration. In addition, Mrs. Heindel prepared writings and 
lessons for the corporation, performed services for it and 
refrained from licensing the writings to others, all of which 
may be considered to have been of some value. Under all the 
circumsta-nces we believe there was nothing of consequence 
required to be restored. 
In this connection plaintiff argues that the pleading 
was insufficient because it did not allege that restoration 
was not necessary. Liberally construed, the cross-complaint 
was sufficient to advise plaintiff of the issues to be met. 
Moreover, it should be observed that plaintiff elicited from 
Mrs. Heindel the answer that she had received no considera-
tion during its examination of her under section 2055 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. Wbile it was not bound by that 
testimony it was brought out as a material issue. 
In the same connection, plaintiff claims the court com-
mitted reversible error in sustaining an objection to a 
question asked Dodson, plaintiff's treasurer, as to whether 
Mrs. Heindel had offered to restore, or had restored, anything 
she received under the contract. Our conclusion that Mrs. 
Heindel had received nothing worthy of restoration answers 
this argument of plaintiff. 
Plaintiff claims that the injunctive provisions of the judg-
ment are improper. It asserts that there is no pleading or 
proof to justify them, that they are uncertain, that some of 
them consist of restraining libelous and slanderous statements 
which are not cognizable in equity since such restraint would 
constitute an unwarranted interference with freedom of speech. 
The cross-complaint appears to plead primarily a cause 
of action for declaratory relief but plaintiff does not assert 
that a declaratory judgment may not also give injunctive 
relief in an equity case. The cross-complaint prays for a 
declaration of rights and such other relief as may be proper. 
The injunctive part of the judgment restrained plaintiff from 
(1) asserting ownership of the property except as trustee for 
the beneficiaries; (2) interfering with their use of the property 
in the conduct of ecclesiastical functions ; ( 3) conducting or 
interfering with the conduct of ecclesiastical functions; (4) 
claiming the exclusive right to use the name "Rosicrucia1;1 
Fellowship''; or interfering with its use by cross-complainants; 
(5) interfering with the use by the followers of the lists and 
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stencils, etc., of names and addresses of followers; ( 6) claim-
ing defendant has no right under the license from Mrs. Heindel 
to print and distribute the writings; (7). interfering with the 
use by Mrs. Heindel, or defendant corporation of the plates 
for printing the writings; ( 8) making either oral or written 
statements that Mrs. Heindel was untruthful, had selfish pur-
poses in organizing defendant corporation, or that defehdant 
corporation was an outlaw organization, or otherwise doing 
acts to deter followers from becoming members of defendant 
corporation; (9) interfering with the exclusive use by Mrs. 
Heindel, or followers designated by defendant church, of con-
fidential discipleship instructions prepared by her. The court 
found that since 1943 plaintiff corporation had taken various 
steps to prevent the followers from organizing themselves 
into a church organization. Those steps consisted of claiming 
power to expel, and expelling followers, making statements 
in derogation of Mrs. Heindel, and casting aspersions on 
defendant corporation so · as to deter followers from becoming 
members, and assure continued adherence to plaintiff. It 
was also found that plaintiff corporation has excluded mem-
bers who participated in the organization of defen.dant cor-
poration from the use of the property ; that plaintiff corpora-
tion took possession of philosophy instructions written by Mrs. 
Heindel; that plaintiff threatens to, and will unless enjoined, 
continue to do those things; that plaintiff claims the right to 
expel followers, and exclude them from the use of the property 
for ecclesiastical and other purposes ; that plaintiff has pre-
vented the use of the list of names, addresses, and stencils. 
That plaintiff is continuing these claims appears from the 
prayer of its complaint where it asks that defendants be 
restrained from using the name 11 The Rosicrucian Fellowship'' 
or anything like it ; from soliciting followers for contributions ; 
and from using any of the writings. 
[10] It is true that an injunction "is ordered against past 
acts only if there is evidence that they will probably recur." 
(Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal.2d 849, 858 [147 P .2d 572].) We 
believe, however, the record sufficiently indicates that the acts 
will probably recur. It is 110t unreasonable to suppose that 
assertions of claims to the property will be injurious to 
cross-complainants. 
. [11] There is no merit to the claim of uncertainty in that 
part of the injunction which restrains interference with the 
dominant use of the property for ecclesiastical purposes by 
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the followers. "Dominant use" clearly means the superior 
right and the judgment in other parts heretofore ·quoted 
defines such rig-hts. 
Complaint is made that the eighth provision of the injunc-
tion, heretofore mentioned (paragraph C [9] of the judgment), 
violates the right of freedom of speech and is like an injunc-
tion restraining slanderous or libelous statements. [12] It 
is established that an injunction will not be granted where 
the restraint interferes with freedom of speech. (See Near 
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 [51 S.Ct. 625, 75 
L.Ed. 1357] ; Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94 (44 P. 458, 
53 Am.St.Rep. 160, 32 L.R.A. 273]; Magill Bros., Inc. v. Build-
ing Service etc. Union, 20 Cal.2d 506 [127 P.2d 542] ; In re 
Wood, 194 Cal. 49 [227 P . 908] ; Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf 
Club, 30 Cal.2d 110, 117 [180 P.2d 321, 171 A.L.R. 913].) 
While it has been said that an injunction may be granted 
to restrain the making of false or libelous statements where 
there is a breach of trust or contract, to injure business rela-
tions (se>e Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th ed., § 1358; 
28 Am.Jur., Injunctions, §§ 118, 119) and although there 
are property and contract aspects in this case, the provision 
here is too broad and does impinge upon freedom of speech 
especially when we consider that religious controversies are 
also concerned. Hence paragraph 0(9) of the judgment must 
be, and is, stricken. 
[13] Plaintiff urges that it should have been granted in-
junctive relief. The judgment declares plaintiff's rights and, 
as such relief is to some extent discretionary with the court, 
(14 Cal.Jur. 185-186) we do not think a reversal is justified. 
[14] Plaintiff claims error in the refusal of its offer of 
proof by a witness, Mrs. Murray. She had testified on direct 
examination that a list of members exhibited to her showed 
the number of followers who were members of defendant 
corporation. On cross-examination plaintiff offered to prove 
by her that the list was not a true one in that it contained names 
of persons who were not members of the fellowship or of 
defendant corporation. We do not think prejudicial error 
was committed when we consider that the trial court may have 
felt that it was unlikely the witness would change her testi-
mony on direct examination and, as we construe the judgment, 
the rights are accorded to all followers of the philosophy 
wheth.er or not they are members of defendant corporation. 
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The judgment is modified by striking out paragraph 0(9) 
thereof, and as so modified, is affirmed. Respondents to 
recover costs on appeal. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied July 17, 
1952. 
[Crim. No. 5275. In Bank. June 20, 1952.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. VER~ON LEBEAU, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Rebuttal Evidence.-Where defend-
ant in a narcotics case testified that he "wouldn't knmv nar-
cotics" and had had no contact with them, testimony of a 
woman acquaintance indicating that he had sam~ knowledge 
of cocaine is admissible and does not tend to show ·the com-
mission of another offense. 
[2] Witnesses-Impeachment-Impeaching One's Own Witness.-
A party may impeach his own witness by the use of prior 
inconsistent statements where he has been surprised and 
damaged by the witness' testimony. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 2049, 2052.) 
[3] !d.-Impeachment-Impeaching One's Own Witness.-Where 
woman, placed on witness stand by prosecution for purpose 
of rebutting defendant's testimony that he did not tell her 
that he used cocaine, denied that he ever told her that he used 
such drug, and such denial was likely to make it appear to 
the jury that the district attorney was harassing defendant by 
asking him whether he had made such a statement to the 
woman, the prosecution is entitled to correct this damaging 
impression by cross-examining its own witness and by im-
peaching her with proof of her prior inconsistent statements. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 304; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 277. 
[2] Right of party surprised by unfavorable testimony of own 
witness to ask him concerning previous inconsistent statements, 
note, 74 A.L.R. 1042. See, also, Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 146; Am. 
Jur., Witnesses, § 798. 
McK. Dig. References : [1] Criminal Law, § 287; [2, 3] Wit-
nesses, § 275 ( 4). 
